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The Bennett Amendment: A
Loophole In the Prohibition Against
Sex Discrimination In Compensation
Under Title VII?
I. Introduction
There is no surer guide in the interpretation of a statute than its
purpose when that is sufficiently disclosed; nor any surer mark of
over solicitude for the letter than to wince at carrying out that
purpose because the words used do not formally quite match with
it.
In the early 1960's the Eighty-eighth Congress enacted the
Equal Pay Act of 19632 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 These statutes have exerted a significant impact on sex dis-
crimination in employment. An employer covered by the Equal Pay
Act may not pay a member of one sex a lower wage than he pays to a
member of the opposite sex if the work is performed in the same
establishment and requires equal levels of skill, effort and responsi-
bility.4 In comparison, Title VII is broader than the Equal Pay Act
and is designed to prohibit a wide variety of discriminatory employ-
ment practices. Under Title VII it is unlawful for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire or otherwise discriminate against an employee with
respect to terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of
that individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.5
i. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Tremaine, 133 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1943) (L. Hand, C.J.).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976) as amended by Equal Employment Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2-13, 86 Stat. 103-13.
4. The Equal Pay Act provides,
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discrim-
inate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between em-
ployees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a
rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production;
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an
employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall
not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of
any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
5. Title VII states in part,
After extensive debate on the Civil Rights Act, Senator Bennett
of Utah offered an amendment as a "technical correction" 6 to section
703(h) of Title VII.7 The Bennett amendment states that a wage dif-
ferential based on sex does not violate Title VII if it is "authorized"
by the Equal Pay Act.8 This amendment has been and continues to
be the source of differing interpretations by the courts,9 the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission' ° (E.E.O.C.), and legal
scholars. " I
The principal focus of this controversy is whether the Bennett
amendment incorporates all the elements necessary for proof of an
Equal Pay Act claim into Title VII.' 2 Thus, it is unclear whether
Title VII offers any protection against sex based wage discrimination
beyond the protection provided by the narrowly drawn Equal Pay
Act.
Divergent interpretations of the Bennett amendment, which
governs the interrelationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII, exist among the federal appellate courts.' 3 Consequently, the
E.E.O.C., which has the statutory responsibility for the day-to-day
enforcement, administration and interpretation of Title VII, 14 is un-
able to effectively perform these statutory functions. The dilemma
of the E.E.O.C. is exacerbated because a recent executive reorganiza-
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
6. See note 48 infra, for a statement by Senator Bennett concerning the purpose of the
amendment.
7. The Bennett amendment, which is contained in the last sentence of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h), provides,
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any em-
ployer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages
or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentia-
tion is authorized by the provisions of section 4(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)) (emphasis added).
8. Id
9. See notes 52-143 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 109-112 and accompanying text infra.
!1. See notes 74 and 133 and accompanying text infra.
12. In particular, the controversy focuses on whether the Equal Pay Act requirement that
the employees perform equal work within the same establishment is incorporated into Title
VII.
13. For the majority interpretation see, e.g., DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d
593 (8th Cir. 1978); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975). Only two courts
of appeals have supported the minority approach. International Union at Electrical Workers
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. No. 79-1893 and 79-1894 (3d Cir., filed Aug. 1, 1980); Gunther
v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court has yet to address
this issue. Johnson v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 20 F.E.P. Cases 1767 (D. Conn. 1979).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(4)-(14) (1976).
tion plan 5 requires the E.E.O.C. to assume the administration and
enforcement of the Equal Pay Act,' 6 in addition to its duties under
Title VII. In order to meet this added responsibility, the E.E.O.C. is
presently engaged in the process of reviewing the interpretations of
the Equal Pay Act issued by the Wage and Hour Administration of
the Department of Labor.' 7
This comment provides a brief overview of the provisions and
purposes of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII 8 and discusses the sev-
eral interpretations of the Bennett amendment' 9 in light of the case
law and relevant administrative interpretations promulgated by the
E.E.O.C.20 and the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor.2 ' Finally, it evaluates the impact and discusses the conse-
quences of these interpretations as they relate to a claimant seeking
relief under Title VII for alleged discrimination in compensation
based on sex.22
II. Overview and Purposes of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII
A. The Equal Pay Act
The Equal Pay Act became law as an amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (F.L.S.A.), on June 10, 1963.23 Reac-
tion to the Equal Pay Act by supporters of the bill was varied. 4 Al-
though some Congressmen described the Act as an end to sex based
15. Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 19807 (1978).
16. The reorganization plan provides in part, "[A]I functions related to enforcing or ad-
ministering section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 206(d)) are
hereby transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission." Id. The commission
has stated that it will not be bound by previous interpretations of the Equal Pay Act made by
the Wage and Hour Administrator of the Department of Labor. See 44 Fed. Reg. 38671
(1979).
17. See 44 Fed. Reg. 38671 (1979).
18. See notes 23-46 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 52-143 and accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 109-112 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 64 and 151 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 144-151 and accompanying text infra.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 200 et seq. (1976) as amended by Equal Pay Act of 1963 Pub. L. 88-38,
§ 3, 77 Stat. 56.
As an amendment to the FLSA, the Equal Pay Act offered certain advantages not offered
by previous equal pay legislation. For example, the new Equal Pay Act would be enforced by
the existing Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor whose system of administra-
tion, investigation and enforcement were already familiar to the business community. The
new act would also be interpreted consistent with case law relating to the FLSA. See H.R.
REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1963). See also Elisburg, Equal Pay in the United States.
The Development and Implementation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 LAB. L.J. 195, 199
(1978) (hereinafter cited as Elisburg]; 109 CONG. REC. 8914 (1963) (remarks of Sen.
MacNamara).
24. For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act, see Gitt &
Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act: Expanding Wage Differential Protection Under Title VII, 8
Loy. CH. L.J. 723 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Gitt & Gelb]; Kantowitz, Sex Based Discrimina-
tion in American Law III. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 4ct and the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
20 HASTINGS L.J. 305 (1968).
wage discrimination 25 and a proclamation of "wage justice for all
working women. 21 6 Most of the Congresswomen who supported the
Equal Pay Act were less enthusiastic.
27
The purpose of the Equal Pay Act, as set forth in the preamble
to the statute, is to end wage differentials based on sex because of
their deleterious effect on interstate commerce.2" The House debate
reveals, however, narrower purpose addressing the social harm that
Congress sought to prohibit. Congress by enacting the Equal Pay
Act intended to ensure that those who performed equal work would
be entitled to equal pay, regardless of sex.29 Subsequent court deci-
sions suggest that the purpose of the Equal Pay Act is to remedy
wage differentials based on the outmoded concept that a man "be-
cause of his role in society should be paid more than a woman even
though his duties are the same. "30
The narrow purpose of the Equal Pay Act is evidenced by the
standard established by Congress for proof of an Equal Pay Act
25. 109 CONG. REC. 9203 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Roosevelt).
26. 109 CONG. REC. 9213 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Halpern).
27. The exact concern of the Congresswomen who spoke in favor of the Equal Pay Act is
unclear. Some Congresswomen objected to the exceptions from coverage under the FLSA
which would bar recovery by women employed in executive, administrative and professional
positions under the Equal Pay Act. 29 U.S.C. 213 (1970) (amended 1974). See, e.g., 109
CONG. REC. 9192, 9193 (1963) (remarks of Rep. St. George and Rep. Bolton). Other Con-
gresswomen expressed explicit criticisms and made such statements as, "one ofthefirst steps
toward an adjustment of balance in pay for women." 109 CONG. REC. 9193 (remarks of Rep.
Boulton) (emphasis added). See also 109 CONG. REC. 9199 (remarks of Rep. Dwyer); 109
CONG. REC. 9201 (remarks of Rep. Kelly); 109 CONG. REC. 9213 (remarks of Rep. Mat-
sunaga).
28. Section 2 of the Declaration of Purpose provides,
(a) The congress hereby finds that the existence in industries engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce of wage differentials based on
sex-
(1) depresses wages and living standards for employees necessary for their health
and efficiency;
(2) prevents the maximum utilization of the available labor resources;
(3) tends to cause labor disputes, thereby burdening affecting, and obstructing
commerce;
(4) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and
(5) constitutes an unfair method of competition.
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act, through exercise by Con-
gress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign
nations, to correct the conditions above referred to in such industries. Equal Pay Act
of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56. See also S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1963) reprinted in 109 CONG. REC. 8914 (1963).
29. "What we seek is to insure, where men and women are doing the same job under the
same working conditions they will receive the same pay." 109 CONG. REC. 9196 (remarks of
Rep. Frelinghuysen). A similar goal was articulated during the Senate debate on the Equal
Pay Act in which Senator MacNamara stated:
Mr. President it is my privilege to bring before the Senate for consideration-and I
trust passage--the Equal Pay Act of 1963. This bill would establish a most worthy
national policy-that an individual who does equal work should be rewarded with
equal pay regardless of his or her sex.
109 CONG. REC. 8914 (1963).
30. Coming Glassworks v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) (emphasis added). Accord,
Shultz v. First Victoria Nat'l Bank, 420 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. Shultz v. Wheaton Glass
Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (Equal Pay Act was a broad
charter of women's rights).
claim.3' In order to prove a prima facie Equal Pay Act claim, courts
require that the plaintiff show that he or she received a lower wage
than a member of the opposite sex working in the same establish-
ment for the performance of work that is substantially equal32 in
terms of skill, effort and responsibility.33 If the plaintiff is able to
establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
show that the wage differential comes within one of the four excep-
tions34 to the Equal Pay Act.35
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The legislative history behind the prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion, as it appears in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is "notable prima-
rily for its brevity."36 Congressman Smith of Virginia offered an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act to add the word sex to the ex-
isting list of characteristics, that, if proven to be the basis for a dis-
criminatory action, give rise to a claim under the Civil Rights Act.37
Congressman Smith is not generally considered to be an ardent civil
rights advocate,38 and he eventually voted against the Civil Rights
Act. 39  Many supporters of the bill were opposed to the Smith
amendment because they felt that the amendment was an attempt on
the part of Congressman Smith and the other southern Congressmen
to sabotage the Civil Rights Act.' Despite the unusual coalition of
Congresswomen and southern Congressmen who supported the
3 1. See note 4 supra.
32. The substantially equal test is not contained in the Equal Pay Act and was first enun-
ciated in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
It was subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Corning Glassworks v. Brennan, 417
U.S. 188 (1974). The term "equal work" is not defined in the Equal Pay Act. The meaning of
the term was the subject of some debate during consideration of the bill by Congress. Several
Congresswomen interpreted the equal work provision as requiring that the plaintiff prove that
the two positions being compared are identical. See, e.g., 109 CONG. REc. 9196 (1963) (re-
marks of Rep. Frelinghuysen); 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Cf
109 CONG. REC. 9213 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Fisher) (equal work may be interpreted as
comparable or identical).
33. See, e.g., Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F,2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I)(i)-(iv) (1976). See note 77 and accompanying text infra.
35. See, e.g., McDonald Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
36. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). For an excellent discussion of the
legislative history of Title VII see, Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REV. 431 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Vaas].
37. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith). The Smith amendment was
offered during debate on H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), shortly before the measure
was sent to the Senate for consideration, The measure was considered by the Senate without
committee action. Thus, no testimony was taken regarding the effect of the Smith amendment
and it was never considered by a House or Senate committee. See Cooper and Sobol, Seniority
and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: 4 General Approach to Objective Criteria in Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969).
38. See Gitt & Gelb, supra note 24, at 743.
39. Id The vote on the measure is listed at 110 CONG. REC. 2804 (1964).
40. For example, Congresswoman Green noted sarcastically that many supporters of the
Smith amendment had voted against the Equal Pay Act the previous year. 110 CONG. REC.
2584 (1964). See also 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay); 110 CONG.
REC. 2581 (remarks of Rep. Green). See generally Vaas, supra note 36, at 441.
amendment, the amendment was approved by a vote of 168 to 133.11
Regardless of the exact motive for which the sex amendment
was offered, the Supreme Court announced a sweeping interpreta-
tion of congressional intent in Franks v. Bowman Transport Co., Inc.,
in which the Court stated, "[I]n enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit allpractices in whatever
form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to dis-
crimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin.
' 42
Therefore, under Title VII it is unlawful for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire, discharge or "otherwise discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privi-
leges of employment because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. '43 In order to effectuate this broad
legislative purpose, Congress vested broad equitable powers in the
federal district courts to grant relief to plaintiffs who have suffered
injuries as a result of unlawful employment discrimination.'
In contrast to the well defined rule for the proof of a prima facie
Equal Pay Act violation, a plaintiff, under Title VII must present
sufficient evidence to create an inference that an unlawful employ-
ment practice has occurred.45 If the plaintiff is able to establish a
prima facie violation of Title VII, the burden shifts to the employer
to show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the alleged un-
lawful practice.46
III. Relationship Between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII
The relationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII is
governed by the Bennett amendment.47 In essence, the Bennett
amendment provides that a sex based wage differential does not vio-
late Title VII if it is "authorized" by the Equal Pay Act.48 Senator
41. 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964).
42. 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (emphasis added).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) which provides:
. . . If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay ... or any
other affirmative relief as the court deems appropriate (emphasis added). See also
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co. Inc., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
45. For a more detailed discussion of the requirements of a prima facie violation of Title
VII, see note 69 infra.
46. McDonald Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). After a defendant has stated
a nondiscriminatory reason justifying the complained of employment practice, the plaintiff
may attempt to rebut the defendant's justification by showing that it is mere pretext for dis-
crimination. Id at 804.
47. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The entire legislative history of the Bennett amendment is
set forth below:
Bennett expressed concern that the consequences of the Smith
amendment, which added the word "sex" to the Civil Rights Act,
had not received adequate consideration in the House. He proposed
his amendment so that, in the event of any conflicts between the two
acts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act would not be nullified.49 In
enacting Title VII, however, Congress exhibited an intent to create
parallel and overlapping, yet independent statutory remedies for the
redress of unlawful employment discrimination. ° Although Con-
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes. I call up my amend-
ment No. 1051 and ask that it be read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On Page 44, line 15, immediately after the period, it is proposed to insert the
following new sentence: 'It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this
title for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the
amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such em-
ployer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 6(d) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)).
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of the
fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees of
Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became effec-
tive only yesterday.
By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration of
this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the word
'sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention may have
been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the word "sex' in the bill
and in the Equal Pay Act.
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be null/ed
I understand that the leadership in charge of the bill have agreed to the amend-
ment as a proper technical correction of the bill. If they will confirm that understand,
I shall ask that the amendment be voted on without asking for the yeas and nays.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful. I be-
lieve it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully ac-
ceptable.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield myself I minute.
We were aware of the conflict that might develop because the Equal Pay Act was
an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards Act car-
ries out certain exceptions.
All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are carried
in the basic act.
Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. RIBICOFF in the chair). The question is
on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Utah. (Putting the question).
The amendment was agreed to.
110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) (emphasis added).
49. Id
50. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the submission of a claim of race discrimination to arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement barred an employee's right to bring suit under Title
VII. In reaching its conclusion, that suit was not barred under Title VII, the Court stated that
Congress in the civil rights area had "long evinced a general intent to afford parallel and
overlapping remedies against discrimination." Id at 47. Similarly in Johnson v. Ry. Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Court concluded that filing charges of a Title VII violation
with the E.E.O.C. did not toll the statute of limitations on a section 1981 civil rights action
based on the same facts. By way of explanation, the court stated,
Despite Title VII's range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the
problems of individual discrimination in employment, the aggrieved individual
clearly is not deprived of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII
in his search for relief. The legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional
intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII
and other applicable state and federal statutes. Id at 448 (emphasis added). Similar
gress provided for separate and independent remedies, the two acts
must be construed in harmony or inpari materia.5'
The ambiguity of the Bennett amendment, particularly the
phrase "authorized by the provisions of' the Equal Pay Act, allows
several distinct interpretations regarding the relationship between
the two acts. Three of these interpretations are set forth below.
A. The Total Incorporation Approach
All but two of the federal courts of appeals that have addressed
the relationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII have ap-
plied the total incorporation approach." Under this approach, the
Bennett amendment is interpreted as incorporating all the provisions
of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. Under this theory, any wage
differential that does not violate the Equal Pay Act is authorized by
the Act for the purposes of Title VII.5 3
The first decision to discuss the relationship between the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII was Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.54 In Shultz,
the court held that the two statutes serve the same fundamental pur-
pose and should be read in pari materia. 11 Nonetheless, the court
refused to delineate the precise manner in which the two statutes
should be harmonized, and held that proof of the Equal Pay Act
violation alone was a sufficient basis for the plaintiff to prevail with-
out consideration of Title VII.
5 6
The first case to address the more specific issue of how the two
statutes should be harmonized was Ammons v. Zia. 57 In Ammons,
language has been used by the courts to describe the relationship between the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII. See Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.
1979); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1976).
5 1. Although Title VII reaches farther than the Equal Pay Act to protect groups
other than those sex based classes and to proscribe discrimination in many facets of
employment additional to compensation nowhere have we encountered an indication
that Title VII was intended either to supplant or be supplanted by the Equal Pay Act in
the relative small area which the two are congruent.
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 445 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1976).
See Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (the
Equal Pay Act should not be construed to undermine Title VII). Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc.,
511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975). Accord, Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971);
E.E.O.C. v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631 (D. Me. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 589 F.2d
1139 (1st Cir. 1978).
52. The federal courts of appeal that did not apply this standard are Gunther v. County
of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979) and International Electrical Workers v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., No. 79-1893 and 79-1894 (3d Cir., filed Aug. 1, 1980).
53. Any activity that does not "run afoul of the Equal Pay Act" is authorized for the
purposes of the Bennett amendment. Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448, 454 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); Johnson v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 20 F.E.P. cases 1767 (D. Conn. 1979) (a finding that
an employer did not violate the Equal Pay Act precludes a finding of unlawful discrimination
under Title VII).
54. 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
55. Id at 266.
56. Id
57. 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971). In Ammons the plaintiff, a female writer editor,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cited Shultz for the prop-
osition that the two statutes must be harmonized and went on to con-
clude that to prove a claim of wage discrimination under Title VII, a
plaintiff must first prove a wage differential based on sex for the per-
formance of substantially equal work.58 Thus, according to 4m-
mons, a plaintiff must prove a violation of the Equal Pay Act to be
able to maintain a wage discrimination claim under Title VII. This
interpretation of the Bennett amendment by the Ammons court is
consistent with the initial interpretation of the amendment issued by
the E.E.O.C. which was later revised.59
The total incorporation approach offers certain advantages not
offered by the other approaches. For example, this approach does
not conflict with the wording of the amendment or its legislative his-
tory.6" This interpretation is also consistent with the congressional
intent to limit the authority of the courts and the Secretary of Labor
to impose their opinions concerning the relative value of comparable
but unequal positions on private employers.6' Moreover, other in-
terpretations of the Bennett amendment, discussed below, do not in-
corporate the equal work standard set forth by Congress in the
Equal Pay Act. That standard was included in the legislation to
make it clear that the Equal Pay Act was not a mandate to eliminate
claimed that she did not receive as high a wage as male writers in the same division doing
substantially equal work. Because all the writers had different backgrounds, levels of experi-
ence and responsibilities, plaintiff Ammons was unable to meet the threshold burden of prov-
ing equal work. The Ammons case illustrates the most criticized shortcoming of the Equal Pay
Act. In many managerial, executive and administrative positions, no two positions are identi-
cal in terms of skill, effort and responsibility. Thus, it is almost impossible for an employee in
one of these positions to prove an Equal Pay Act violation. Consequently, under the total
incorporation approach, if no Equal Pay Act violation can be proved, plaintiff may not recover
under Title VII regardless of other evidence of wage based discrimination. Another problem
inherent in "white collar" jobs is that in most instances promotions and raises are based on
subjective factors making sex discrimination particularly difficult to prove. See Pantchenko v.
C.B. Dolge, Inc., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978) (chemist); Barnes v. Callaghan & Co., 559 F.2d
1102 (7th Cir. 1977) (manager of editorial department); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, 511 F.2d 166
(5th Cir. 1975) (accounting department manager). But see DiSalvo v. Chamber of Commerce,
416 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978) (newsletter associate
editor).
This problem is particularly evident in the field of education. A professor's evaluations
often depend on his or her "creativity, rapport with students and colleagues, his teaching abil-
ity and numerous other intangible qualities which cannot be measured by objective stan-
dards." Sweeny v. Bd. of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 176 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978). See also Molthan v.
Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (medical school professor and director of the
university blood bank).
58. 448 F.2d at 120.
59. Relationship of Title VII to the Equal Pay Act, 29 C.F.R. 1604.7 (1965). See note
108 and 109 and accompanying text infra
60. See note 48 supra.
61. See 109 CONG. REC. 9196 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen). One court has
stated, "Congress realized that the majority of job differences are made for genuine economic
reasons unrelated to sex. It did not authorize the Secretary or the courts to engage in whole-
sale reevaluation of any employer's pay structure in order to enforce their own conception of
economic worth." Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282, 285 (1974). Accord
Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1977).
all wage discrimination. The Equal Pay Act, rather, was intended
only to eliminate discrimination in the equal work context. It is un-
likely that after extensive debate on the Equal Pay Act, only one
year prior to enacting Title VII, Congress would change its mind
and, through Title VII, eliminate that standard.62 In addition, the
total incorporation approach applies the simple Equal Pay Act stan-
dard for establishing a wage discrimination claim and does not sub-
ject the private employer to two sets of conflicting standards for the
proof of sex discrimination in wages.63
Despite the advantages of the inclusion of the entire Equal Pay
Act into Title VII, this approach creates certain difficulties. Initially,
the inclusion of the equal work standard into Title VII may allow
sex based wage differentials to go unremedied under Title VII be-
cause the wage differential does not violate the Equal Pay Act. For
example, if a member of one sex occupies a position for which there
is no equivalent position in terms of skill, effort and responsibility,
no violation of the Equal Pay Act exists and thus, Title VII is not
violated.' Similarly, the Equal Pay Act does not prohibit an em-
ployer from paying two members of the opposite sex unequal wages
for identical work if the two individuals work in two physically sepa-
62. Legislation similar to the Equal Pay Act was considered by the 87th Congress in 1962
and 1963. H.R. 8898, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963). One of the basic differences between H.R.
8898 and the Equal Pay Act is that H.R. 8898 initially contained the phrase "comparable
work" as opposed to "equal work." Congresswoman St. George moved to amend the bill by
changing the language to equal work. The amendment was approved by a vote of 138-104.
See 108 CONG. REC. 14767-14771 (1962).
63. See, e.g., Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (pur-
pose of Bennett amendment is to ensure that the same standard of proof is applied to wage
discrimination claims under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act).
64. Consider the following hypothetical: A university employs cleaning help segregated
by sex into two classifications; heavy cleaners (male) and light cleaners (female). The only
differences between the two classifications are that the heavy cleaners empty heavy waste cans
into the dumpsters and occasionally perform work in buildings on the outside perimeter of the
campus. Assume that the wage range for heavy cleaners is $7.50-10.00 an hour, and the wage
rate for light cleaners is $3.10-4.50 an hour. Under the rule in Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568
F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1977), plaintiffs could not maintain an Equal Pay Act claim because of the
existence of unequal work. Thus, under the total incorporation approach, plaintiffs would be
barred from asserting a claim under Title VII even if they could prove that the head of the
plant operations told them that the disparity in pay was based on sex and not for the difference
in effort between the two positions.
Similarly, an employer may discriminate on the basis of sex under the Equal Pay Act as
long as he does not do so within the same establishment. Assume, for example, that an em-
ployer maintains two identical manufacturing plants within one mile of each other. In one
plant, he employs a male shipping clerk and in the other, he employs a female shipping clerk.
The two positions are identical in all respects. The employer may pay the male shipping clerk
twice what he pays the female, because of her sex, and not violate the Equal Pay Act. See 29
C.F.R. § 800.108 (1979). Under the total incorporation theory, this practice is not a violation
of Title VII unless they are employed at the same plant.
Another criticism of the Equal Pay Act is that it does not offer a remedy for an employee
who is discriminated against in compensation and occupies a unique position within the estab-
lishment. One court stated that, "while the practice of paying a uniquely situated employee
less than would be paid a member of the opposite sex in the same position, may be a violation
of other laws and reprehensible, it does not violate this Act [the Equal Pay Act]. Rinkel
Associated Pipeline Contractors, 17 F.E.P. Cases 224, 226 (D. Alaska 1978).
rate establishments.65 By determining that any wage differential that
does not violate the Equal Pay Act will not violate Title VII, courts
that subscribe to the total incorporation approach permit intentional
sex discrimination in areas that are merely beyond the narrow scope
of the Equal Pay Act.66
Undeniably, utilization of the elements of the test for a prima
facie case required by the Equal Pay Act presents a clearly defined
standard for Title VII wage discrimination claims.67 Nonetheless,
rights under Title VII are not predicated upon the ease of establish-
ing a claim.68 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the
court will not utilize an inflexible standard for the proof of a discrim-
ination claim under Title VII.6 9 An employee's receipt of unequal
65. This issue has not been raised in any decisions of the courts of appeal that have
incorporated the equal work standard into Title VII. Under the theory that any wage differen-
tial not violating the Equal Pay Act is not a violation of Title VII, the establishment concept as
well as the equal work standard would be incorporated into Title VII. In Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978), the court stated that it was clear from the case
law that the Bennett amendment incorporated the equal work standard into Title VII. The
court found no support, however, for the contention that the Bennett amendment incorporated
the establishment concept. Id at 407. The court ignored the clause in Title VII which pro-
vides that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation to employees who work in different locations, provided that such
differentials are not the result of an intention to discriminate. . . because of sex .... " 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (h) (1976) (emphasis added). Obviously, this provision is broader than the
establishment concept found in the Equal Pay Act which ignores the intent of the employer.
66. Several cases claiming wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII
have contained testimony that the alleged discriminatory wage differential was intentional.
See, e.g., Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1975) (female employee was told
that her supervisor would not approve of a woman being paid as much as a man); Bourqe v.
Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (statement by a male supervisor that
a man would always be a better buyer than a woman); Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp.
494 (D.N.D. 1976) (statement by supervisor to the effect that if employer gave the plaintiff a
raise all the female employees would want a raise). Although discriminatory intent is relevant
in a Title VII action alleging discriminatory treatment, International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977), it is irrelevant in an Equal Pay Act action if the
plaintiff is unable to prove equal work. Thus, under the total incorporation approach, the
discriminatory intent of the employer is irrelevant if the plaintiff is unable to establish a prima
facie Equal Pay Act violation.
67. See notes 32 and 33 and accompanying text supra.
68. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 1979). Gunther is
discussed at length in notes 84-90 and accompanying text infra
69. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). The most
frequently cited test for establishing a prima facie violation of Title VII is given in McDonald
Douglas, Inc. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the test announced in Green the plaintiff
must show,
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applications from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id at 802. The Court added a caveat; that the above test does not apply to all fact situations
arising under Title VII. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977), the Court seized upon this caveat and explained that the Green decision was not in-
tended to create an inflexible standard by which to measure all subsequent Title VII claims.
Moreover, the court stated that a prima facie violation of Title VII could be sustained by a
claimant upon a showing of evidence sufficient to "create an inference that an employment
decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the act." Id at 358. The re-
quirements for a proof of a prima facie case will vary with respect to the type of discrimination
alleged. [d The question whether an employer has engaged in a discriminatory practice under
pay for equal work is a relevant factor in any Title VII wage discrim-
ination claim,7" but, the total incorporation theory makes it an essen-
tial element of the plaintiffs prima facie case only in wage
discrimination claims based on sex.7 Consequently, using the total
incorporation approach, Title VII's prohibitions against discrimina-
tion in employment are not coextensive with the prohibition of dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion or national origin.7 2 In
contrast, courts deciding sex based Title VII claims unrelated to
compensation, adopt the same tests for each type of discrimination
regardless of whether the claim is based on discrimination because of
race, color, sex, religion or national origin.7 3
B. The Selective Incorporation Approach
The selective incorporation approach is based upon the remarks
of Senator Dirksen during the short debate on the Bennett amend-
ment.74 Essentially, Senator Dirksen explained that the Equal Pay
Title VII is a question of fact for determination on a case by case basis. See, e.g., Bradford v.
Sloan Paper Co., Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1157 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
70. This is true regardless whether the Title VII claim is based on race, color, religion or
national origin.
71. See note 72 infra.
[I]t should be noted that the result of implying into Title VII the equal pay restriction
to equal pay for equal work may very well provide women with less of a remedy
under Title VII than is available to blacks or other minorities.
Gitt & Gelb, supra note 24, at 758.
72. Although a black employee may have a less arduous burden of proof to establish
Title VII claim of discrimination in compensation, the burden of proof has been sufficiently
difficult to defeat most claims. See Roman v. E.S.B. Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976);
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 457 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1972); Bradford v. Sloan Paper Co., Inc., 383
F. Supp. 1157 (D. Ala. 1974). But see Randolf v. U.S. Elevator Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.
Fla. 1978).
This situation raises interesting possibilities. Suppose, for example, that A, a black wo-
man employee, works on an all female assembly line next to B, a white woman. Additionally,
assume that the plant supervisor told A and B that he would never pay a woman or a black as
much as any white man in the plant performing similar but unequal tasks. Under the total
incorporation approach, A could maintain a wage based Title VII claim of race discrimination,
but B, in the same position, would have no recourse to recovery under Title VII or the Equal
Pay Act.
Several provisions of the Civil Rights Act, however, indicate a congressional intent that
the prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Act are not coextensive for all pro-
tected groups. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976), states that it is not an unlawful
practice to treat employees differently on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin if that
behavior is justified by a bona fide occupational qualification. Significantly, a bona fide occu-
pational qualification is not a defense to a race discrimination case under Title VII.
73. See, e.g., Miller v. Williams, 590 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1979) (discriminatory discharge);
Miller v. Weber, 577 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1978) (Hiring discrimination); Adams v. Reed, 567 F.2d
1283 (5th Cir. 1978) (failure to promote); East v. Romaine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975)
(hiring discrimination). But cf. Roller v. San Mateo, 572 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1977) (forced
pregnancy leave).
74. The Selective incorporation approach has been explained as follows,
In the words of the amendment's sponsor, 'The purpose of my amendment is to
provide that in the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be
nullified.'
Thus a wage or fringe differential between employees of opposite sexes based
upon one of the factors,for example, seniority or merit, referred to in section 6(d) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act cannot constitute an unfair employment practice under Title
Act is an amendment to the F.L.S.A. and that the F.L.S.A. contained
certain exceptions. According to Senator Dirksen, the Bennett
amendment merely incorporates into Title VII the exceptions con-
tained in the "basic act."" Several courts suggest that the import of
Senator Dirksen's remarks is that the Bennett amendment only in-
corporates the four basic exceptions found in the Equal Pay Act.76
These four exceptions provide that a sex based wage differential does
not violate the Equal Pay Act if made "pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; (iv) a differential based on any
other factor other than sex.""
As in the total incorporation approach, this approach focuses on
the interpretation given to the term "authorized" contained in the
Bennett amendment.7 8 Under the selective incorporation approach,
an act is considered to be authorized under the Equal Pay Act only if
the wage differential falls within one of the four explicit exceptions.79
Under the selective incorporation theory, the intentional payment of
a discriminatory sex based wage differential between two employees
of the opposite sex who perform similar but unequal work, or be-
tween two employees of the opposite sex who perform substantially
equal work in different establishments, is not considered to be au-
thorized by the Equal Pay Act, but merely beyond its narrow scope
of prohibited activities. Clearly, the Equal Pay Act should not be
interpreted as authorizing intentional sex discrimination in the pay-
ment of wages.
Several cases contain language supporting the selective incorpo-
ration approach. In Manhart v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power,80 the court, in a Title VII action concerning a requirement
that women contribute a larger monthly payment to an annuity plan
than men because statistically women live longer, stated that, "all
that the Bennett amendment did was to incorporate the exemptions
of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. ' ' 8' In a later case, Laffey v.
North west Airlines,82 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
VII. Title VII would probably have been so interpreted without the Bennett amend-
ment, but the amendment makes this clear; just as the other amendments reflected in
subsections (g) and (h) confirm and clarify what the House Judiciary Committee
seems to have intended when it reported H.R. 7152 but which the bill itself did not
articulate in unequivocal terms.
Vaas, supra note 36, at 449 (emphasis added).
75. See note 48 supra.
76. See notes 80-107 and accompanying text infra.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
78. See note 48 supra
79. See notes 80-107 and accompanying text infra.
80. 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976) vacated on other grounds sub nont 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
81. Id at 590.
82. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). The plaintiffs in
Laffey were female stewardesses who alleged that their male counterparts, in the purser posi-
bia Circuit reached a similar result, stating that a wage differential is
immune from attack under Title VII only if it comes within one of
the four exception to the Equal Pay Act."3
In Gunther v. County of Washington,84 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit repudiated the total incorporation approach. In
Gunther, the plaintiffs alleged that they received unequal pay for
equal work, and, in the alternative, that even if the positions were
not substantially equal to positions held by higher paid males the
disparity in wages resulted from sex discrimination. The court dis-
tinguished prior cases on the ground that they contained allegations
of a denial of equal pay for equal work.85 According to Gunther, a
federal appellate court had yet to address the question of whether a
sex discrimination claim that alleged comparable work was cogniza-
ble under Title VII.86 The Gunther court noted that in enacting the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII, Congress provided for parallel and
overlapping statutory remedies in order to alleviate the effects of un-
lawful employment discrimination. 7 Despite its conclusion that
plaintiffs failed to prove their Equal Pay Act claim, the court held
that this conclusion did not automatically defeat plaintiffs' wage
claim brought under Title VII.88 Furthermore, the court concluded
that the Bennett amendment incorporated only the four defenses to
the Equal Pay Act.8 9 Nevertheless, the court did not disregard the
equal work standard, but stated that its use was proper in a situation
where a Title VII plaintiff alleges unequal pay for substantially
equal work.90
tion, were receiving substantially higher pay. The defendant raised an imaginative defense.
Defendant argued that if the two positions were substantially equal, no actionable Title VII
claim would arise for a denial of advancement opportunities to the purser position. If the
positions were not substantially equal, the plaintiffs could attempt to prove a Title VII claim,
but not an Equal Pay Act claim. Thus, defendant concluded the two causes of action were
mutually exclusive in the fact situation before the court. The court, however, was not so per-
suaded.
83. Id at 446.
84. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979). In Gunther the plaintiffs were prison matrons who
alleged that the prison matron position was substantially equal to the prison guard position
and that they received a lower salary. The Gunther court noted that the salary range for a
female prison matron was from $525 to $668 a month and the salary range for a male prison
guard was from $736 to $940 a month. Id at 886.
85. Id at 888. But see I.U.E. v. Westinghouse Inc., 19 F.E.P. cases 9144 (N.D.N.J.
1979); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
86. 602 F.2d at 888.
87. Id at 890. See generally note 50.
88. 602 F.2d at 890.
89. Id
90. The Gunther court espoused the following test for proof of a claim brought under
both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII:
[WIe held that although decisions interpreting the Equal Pay Act are authoritative
where plaintiffs suing under Title VII raise a claim of equal pay, plaintiffs are not
precluded from suing under Title VII to protest other discriminatory compensation
practices unless the practices are authorized under one of the four affirmative de-
fenses contained in the Equal Pay Act and incorporated into Title VII by [the Ben-
nett amendment].
The most extensive examination of the comparable work issue
was made by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in International
Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse.9 In Westinghouse, the
appellants alleged that Westinghouse had deliberately discriminated
against female employees by maintaining lower wage rates for job
classifications that were predominantly filled by women.92 The Dis-
trict Court granted summary judgment for Westinghouse on the
grounds that the plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action under
Title VII by failing to make the showing that female employees re-
ceived a lower wage for performing work substantially equal to that
performed by male employees.93 Although the plaintiffs did not
claim that men and women in the same job classifications received
disparate wages, plaintiffs did allege that Westinghouse had deliber-
ately set lower wage rates "for those job classifications which were
predominantly filled by females than the wage rates for those job
classifications which were predominantly filled by males."9 4
According to the court of appeals, the basic issue in the case
concerned the interpretation of the following phrase contained in the
Bennett amendment, "if such differentiation is authorized by" the
Equal Pay Act.95 In order to determine the exact meaning of this
phrase, the court in Westinghouse carefully examined various
sources including statutory language, legislative history, administra-
tive rulings and relevant case law.
Initially, the court examined policy considerations underlying
the enactment of Title VII. The court was persuaded that the incor-
Id at 891.
91. No. 79-1893 and 79-1894 (3d Cir., filed August 1, 1980).
92. Id at 5.
93. International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 19 F.E.P.
Cases 450 (D.N.J. 1979).
94. International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 79-
1893 and 79-1894 slip op. at 5 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1980). The court in its opinion supplied the













LG-l 1 0 0
LG-12 19 0
LG-13 19 0
Thus, the court concluded that 85% of the female employees were assigned to the four lowest
job classifications and that wage inequities set up by appellee's 1930's job classification system
had not been eradicated.
95. See note 48 and accompanying text supra
poration of the "substantially equal work" standard into Title VII
would substantially limit the power of Title VII to address claims of
sex discrimination in compensation.9 6 Consistent with its conclusion
that Congress had not intended to limit the scope of Title VII, the
court decided that the selective incorporation interpretation of the
Bennett amendment best achieved the policy objectives behind the
enactment of Title VII.9 7
After discussing the policy considerations underlying Title VII,
the court concentrated upon the legislative history of the Bennett
amendment. Although the court found the legislative history of the
amendment ambiguous, it concluded that the legislative history sup-
ported the selective incorporation approach.98 Apparently, the court
was persuaded by Senator Dirksen's remarks that the amendment
merely recognized the exceptions contained in the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act. 99 The Westinghouse court dismissed statements, by Sena-
tor Bennett and other legislators, which were not made
contemporaneous with the adoption of the Bennett amendment.1t°
Next, the court examined Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission decisions and regulations determining the meaning of
96. International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 79-
1893 and 79-1894 slip op. at 13 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1980).
97. The court quoted the following portion of an opinion by the Supreme Court:
We begin by repeating the observation of earlier decisions that by enacting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit practices in
whatever form which create inequalities in employment opportunity on the basis of
race, religion, sex or national origin . . . and ordained that its policy of outlawing
such discrimination should have the 'highest priority.'...
Id at 14, quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (197 6 ) (emphasis
by the court) (citations omitted).
98. International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 79-
1893 and 79-1894 slip op. at 25 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1980).
99. The court relied primarily upon the statements of Senator Bennett and Senator Dirk-
sen made shortly before adoption of the amendment. 110 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1964). See note
48 supra. The court interpreted these statements as an indication that the intention of the
Bennett amendment was merely to incorporate the four exceptions of the Equal Pay Act into
Title VII. The court also discussed Senator Celer's remarks made on July 2, 1969, "Second.
(The senate amendment) [p]rovides that compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, as
amended, satisfies the requirement of Title VII barring discrimination because of sex-Section
703(b)." International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 79-
1893 and 79-1894, slip op. at 21 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1980) quotingfrom 110 Cong. Rec. 13647
(1964). The District Court interpreted this provision as an indication that Title VII's protec-
tion against wage discrimination is no broader than the Equal Pay Act. The court of appeals,
however, was persuaded that Senator Celler's remarks indicated "that compliance with the
'equal work' requirements of the Equal Pay Act met Title VII's requirements on that issue
only." Id at 21.
100. The court also examined Senator Clark's remark that, "the standards in the Equal
Pay Act for determining discrimination as to wages, of course, are applicable to the compara-
ble situations under Title VII." 110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964). Although the court felt that this
statement could support two diametrically opposed positions, it avoided the issue by stating
that this statement was made on April 4, 1964, more than two months before adoption of the
Bennett amendment and, thus, this statement was not helpful in ascertaining the legislative
intent. Id at 19. The court gave similar treatment to a statement made by Senator Bennett a
year after passage of the amendment and a 1977 senate report interpreting the Bennett amend-
ment.
the Bennett amendment. In particular, the court focused on the ap-
parent conflict between EEOC regulations interpreting the Bennett
amendment issued in 1965 and those issued in 1972.101 The court
explained away this apparent conflict by emphasizing the language
of the 1965 amendment which provides that, "with respect to situa-
tions to which both statutes are applicable. . . the standards of the
Equal Pay Act" are applicable to Title VII.' °2 The court refused to
interpret the 1965 regulation as limiting the scope of Title VII to the
parameters of the Equal Pay Act." 3 In addition, the court found
support for its interpretation in EEOC opinions, decided before pro-
mulgation of the 1972 amendments, which held that a cause of ac-
tion exists for situations where "the wage rates for jobs held
predominantly by women were set lower than the wage rates for jobs
held primarily by men,"'' " if that wage disparity is based on sex.
Finally, the Westinghouse court scrutinized the case law inter-
preting the Bennett amendment and concluded that it added "little
to our inquiry.""'  The court suggested that the only court of ap-
peals decision to directly address the comparable work issue was the
Gunther ° 6 opinion and that other court of appeals cases that dealt
with this issue and the incorporation of the equal work standard, had
done so only by way of dicta.'
0 7
In conformity with the underlying social policy implications of
the incorporation of the equal work doctrine into Title VII, the
E.E.O.C. rejected its adherence to the total incorporation approach.
The initial guideline pertaining to the interrelationship between Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act was issued by the E.E.O.C. in 1965.1
The E.E.O.C.'s interpretation of the Bennett amendment, as evi-
denced by the guideline, was that to prove a Title VII wage discrimi-
nation claim, the plaintiff must first prove equal work. In 1972,
however, the E.E.O.C. revised this guideline by deleting the require-
101. See notes 108-112 infra.
102. This conclusion appears to support the congruence theory. See notes 127-143 infra.
103. International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 79-
1893 and 79-1894 slip op. at 27 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1980).
104. Id at 28.
105. Id at 28.
106. 602 F.2d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1979).
107. International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 79-
1893 and 79-1894, slip op. at 29 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 1980).
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1965). Section (a) of the guideline provides as follows:
Title VII requires that its provisions be harmonized with the Equal Pay Act
(section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)) in order to
avoid conflicting interpretations or requirements with respect to situations to which
both statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the Commission interprets section 703(h) to
mean that the standards of "equalpayfor equal work" setforth in the Equal Pay Actfor
determining what is unlawful discrimination in compensation are applicable to Title VII.
However, it is the judgment of the Commission that the employee coverage of the
prohibition against discrimination in compensation because of sex is co-extensive
with that of the other prohibitions in section 703, and is not limited by section 703(h)
to those employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (emphasis added).
ment that a plaintiff prove equal work as a prerequisite to a Title VII
wage discrimination claim.09
The weight that should be accorded to the 1972 revision is un-
clear. In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court in GeneralElec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert"° held that although E.E.O.C. guidelines are
generally accorded great weight as evidence of legislative intent," I a
revised guideline issued eight years after the Civil Rights Act was
enacted would be accorded less weight than a conflicting guideline
promulgated contemporaneous with the passage of the statute."
2
Another interpretation of the Bennett amendment exists which
strongly supports the selective incorporation approach. This varia-
tion of the selective incorporation approach was supplied by Senator
Bennett approximately a year after the adoption of the Bennett
amendment. "t3 In response to an interpretation of his amendment in
a law review article, ' l4 Senator Bennett explained that the purpose of
the Bennett amendment was to incorporate into Title VII the de-
fenses of the Equal Pay Act, in addition to the exemptions contained
in the F.L.S.A." 5 This interpretation of the Bennett amendment
109. The revised guideline provides,
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against discrimination based on
sex contained in title VII is coextensive with that of the other prohibitions contained
within title VII and is not limited by section 703(h) to those employees covered by the
Fair Labor Standards Act.
(b) By virtue of section 703(h), a defense based on the Equal Pay Act may be
raised in a proceeding under title VII.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1972).
110. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert the plaintiffs relied on an E.E.O.C. guideline pertain-
ing to disability benefits for pregnancy under Title VII. The initial guideline promulgated in
1965 was revised in 1972.
111. See also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
112. 429 U.S. at 143. The two situations are not identical, however. In General Electric,
the Court found that the 1972 guideline conflicted not only with the earlier E.E.O.C. guideline,
but also with the legislative history, previous opinion letters issued by the E.E.O.C. and with
Wage and Hour Administration guidelines construing the Equal Pay Act. The revised guide-
line pertaining to the relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act conflicts only with
the prior regulation and evidence suggests that it is consistent with an opinion letter issued by
the E.E.O.C. in 1965. In its opinion letter, the Commission stated that the Bennett amendment
"merely incorporates by reference into Title VII the enumerated defenses set forth in the Fair
Labor Standards Act (which were added to that Act by the Equal Pay Act of 1963) together
with such interpretative rulings thereon as the Wage and Hour Administration has made or
may make." E.E.O.C. Opinion Letter, October 12, 1965 as quoted in Kantowitz, supra note
24, at 346 n.173.
113. 111 CONG. REC. 13359-13360 (1965). Senator Bennett's concluding statement was,
"Simply stated, the amendment means that discrimination in compensation on account of sex
does not violate Title VII unless it also violates the Equal Pay Act." Id.
114. Vans, supra note 36. The Vaas article on the legislative history of Title VII has been
cited on several occasions by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., University of California Regents v.
Baake, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 351 (1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 761 (1976). Senator Bennett as
a preface to his remarks quoted from Mr. Vans' article. Ill CONG. REc. 1359 (1965).
115. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 200,et seq. (1976) contains many "exemptions" from cover-
age. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976). Among those exempted from coverage under the Act are employ-
ees in administrative, executive and professional positions, and employees in certain various
fields. This interpretation would explain Senator Dirksen's ambiguous remark, made during
merely results in the incorporation of the four exceptions to the
Equal Pay Act, because Congress in 1972 amended the F.L.S.A.1 6 to
make the general exemptions from coverage found in the F.L.S.A.
inapplicable to the Equal Pay Act." 
7
The main advantage to the selective incorporation approach is
that it does not absorb the equal work standard, and thus it prohibits
intentional employment discrimination in compensation based on
sex. 118 This interpretation also grants protection against sex based
discrimination in compensation coextensive with Title VII protection
against wage discrimination based on race, color, religion or national
origin. I"9 Critics of the selective incorporation approach legitimately
argue that this doctrine engenders a greater intrusion of the courts
into employment decisions in the private sector. One court noted,
however, that the policy of non-intervention will not justify the abdi-
cation of the responsibility entrusted to the courts by Congress to
provide a forum for the litigation of suits alleging intentional sex
discrimination under Title VII. 20
Selective incorporation raises further difficulties in that the ne-
cessity of the Bennett amendment is doubtful since section 703(h) of
Title VII 2 contains three of the four exceptions found in the Equal
Pay Act.' 22 Thus, under the selective incorporation approach, the
the debate, that the Bennett amendment merely incorporates the exceptions that "are carried
in the basic act" 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964) (emphasis added).
116. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, Title 14, § 906(bO(l), 86 Stat.
375 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976)).
117. The courts have not addressed the issue of divergent coverage under the two acts.
The Equal Pay Act covers only employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1976). Title VII contains broader language covering any
employee in an industry affecting commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). Theoretically,
under the total incorporation approach, it may be argued that if an employee is not within the
coverage provisions of the Equal Pay Act, a wage differential paid by his or her employer is
not a violation of the Equal Pay Act and, thus, there is no violation of Title VII. The E.E.O.C.
in its interpretative guideline has reached the opposite conclusion. The guideline provides that
coverage of Title VII wage discrimination claims is "co-extensive with that of other protections
contained in Title VII and is not limited by 703(h) to those employees covered by the [FLSA]."
29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1979).
118. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
120. In a case under Title VII in which the plaintiff alleged sex discrimination in higher
education, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated:
[W]e voice misgivings over the notion that courts should keep "hands off' the
salary, promotion, and hiring decisions of colleges and universities. This reluctance
no doubt arises from the courts' recognition that hiring, promotion, and tenure deci-
sions require subjective evaluation most appropriately made by persons thoroughly
familiar with the academic setting. Nevertheless, we caution againstpermitting judicial
deference to result in judicial abdication of a responsibility entrusted to the courts by
Congress. That responsibility is simply to provide a forum for the litigation of com-
plaintis of sex discrimination in institutions of higher learning as readily as for other
Title VII suits.
Sweeny v. Bd. of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 176 (1st Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
122. In the section that includes the Bennett amendment, the language immediately pre-
ceding the amendment provides in pertinent part: "[Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, con-
Bennett amendment is largely redundant and unnecessary. It is also
unlikely that Congress, after careful consideration of the Equal Pay
Act one year earlier, intended to legislate a different standard by
which to measure wage discrimination claims under Title VI1 23 that
would subject the employer to two different standards to follow in
order to avoid wage discrimination claims. 24 Finally, although the
legislative history does not indicate an intention to apply different
standards to sex discrimination claims, some indication exists that
Congress did not intend to treat all groups identically under Title
VII. 25 For example, the bona fide occupational qualification de-
fense to a Title VII claim applies only to discrimination claims based
on sex, religion or national origin, but significantly not on race.
126
C Congruence Approach
The congruence theory is less dependent on an interpretation of
the Bennett amendment than on a logical attempt to construe the
two statutes harmoniously. t27  The congruence approach is based
upon four assumptions: First, Title VII offers broader protection
ditions or privileges of employment pursuant to a bonafide seniority or merit system, or a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality ofproduction." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976) (emphasis added). The only defense contained in the Equal Pay Act that is not con-
tained in Title VII is the fourth exception, "a differential based on any other factor other than
sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(iv) (1976). Arguably, this fourth defense may be unnecessary under
Title VII because of Title VII's bona fide occupational qualification defense contained in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). It should be noted, however, that Senator Bennett offered his
amendment as a technical correction to the Act. See note 48 supra.
123. See Gitt and Gelb, note 24 supra, at 739. Congressman Goodell during debate on
the Equal Pay Act emphasized the narrow nature of the Equal Pay Act provision stating as
follows:
Last year when the House changed the word "comparable" to "equal" the clear
intention was to narrow the whole concept. We went from "comparable" to "equal"
meaning that the jobs involved should be virtually identical, that i, they would be very
much alike or closely related to each other.
We do not expect the Labor Department people to go into an establishment and
attempt to rate jobs that are not equal. We do not want to hear the Department say,
"Well, they amount to the same thing," and evaluate them so they come up to the
same skill or point. We expect this to apply only to jobs that are substantially identi-
cal or equal. I think that the language in the bill last year which has been adopted
this year, and has been further expanded by reference to equal skill, effort, and work-
ing conditions, is intended to make this point very clear.
109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (emphasis added).
124. Several courts have suggested that the purpose of the Bennett amendment is to pro-
vide for the same burden of proof in wage discrimination claims brought under Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act and to avoid subjecting the employer to two different standards. See, e.g.,
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 397 (W.D. Pa. 1978); EEOC v. Colby College,
439 F. Supp. 437 (D. Me. 1977), rev'don other grounds, 589 F.2d 1139 (ist Cir. 1978).
125. See note 72 supra.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
127. As the name of the approach suggests, this theory attempts to define the extent to
which the two statutes are congruent.
Although Title VII reaches farther than the Equal Pay Act to protect groups
other than those sex based classes to proscribe discrimination in many facets of em-
ployment additional to compensation, nowhere have we encountered an indication
that Title VII was intended either to supplement or to be supplemented by the Equal
Pay Act in the relatively small area where they are congruent.
against employment discrimination than the Equal Pay Act. 28 Sec-
ond, Congress in enacting the two statutes intended to provide over-
lapping yet independent remedies to alleviate unlawful employment
discrimination. 1 29 Third, any wage differential based only on sex is a
discriminatory employment practice under title VII. 30 Last, that
neither statute should be construed in a manner which would under-
mine the other. 3 '
This theory recognizes, as a basic concept, that sex discrimina-
tion in compensation that is actionable under Title VII can exist in-
dependently of the equal work-equal pay context of the Equal Pay
Act. Under this approach, the statutory rights created by the Equal
Pay Act can be considered as a subset of Title VII rights prohibiting
discrimination in compensation. 32 Consequently, if a claimant al-
leges wage discrimination under Title VII, which would also consti-
tute a violation of the Equal Pay Act, the court will utilize the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act. If the claimant alleges wage dis-
crimination beyond the narrow parameters of the Equal Pay Act,
however, his or her rights under Title VII will not be lost because of
the plaintiff's inability to establish equal work within the same estab-
lishment as required by the Equal Pay Act.'3 3 Thus, the inability to
Laffey v. Northwestern Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978) (emphasis added).
The question raised is the extent to which the protections under the two statutes are con-
gruent. The proponents of the total incorporation approach argue that protections under the
two acts are coextensive, and that Title VII's protection against sex discrimination in compen-
sation is no broader than the Equal Pay Act. The proponents of the congruence approach
argue that the two acts are coextensive only to the extent that the plaintiff may pursue an equal
pay claim under both, but Title VII protections against wage discrimination are not limited to
this narrow sphere. See generally Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.
1979). See also Gitt & Gelb, supra note 24.
128. Title VII protections against employment discrimination are broader than the Equal
Pay Act in many respects. Initially, the Equal Pay Act applies only to sex discrimination in
employment, whereas Title VII applies to claims of discrimination based on race, color, reli-
gion and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Moreover, Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination based on race, color, sex, religion and national origin. 42 U.S.C. §2000c-2(a)
(1976). In addition, Title VII prohibits discrimination in "compensation, terms, conditions
and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), whereas, the Equal Pay Act
only prohibits certain forms of discrimination in "wages." 29 U.S. C. § 206(d) (1976).
129. See note 50 supra.
130. The Supreme Court in Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702 (1978), stated that a practice is discriminatory and unlawful if the evidence shows "treat-
ment of a person in a manner which but for the person's sex would be different." Id at 711
quoting, Comment, Developments in the Law. Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1170 (1971).
131. See note 51 supra.
132. Basically, any violation of the Equal Pay Act also constitutes a violation of Title VII,
but not vice versa.
133. [A]t the time the Bennett amendment was passed by the Senate it was quite clear
that both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII were separate and independent in scope,
except that the standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination in
wages was applicable to 'comparable' situations under Title VII. In other words, if a
claimant charged she was being paid less at a job which was equal in skill, effort and
responsibility to men's jobs, the Equal Pay Act standards were appropriate.
Gitt & Gelb, supra note 24, at 747.
prove an Equal Pay Act claim will not preclude a Title VII claim
based on sex discrimination in compensation.
134
This manner of construing the interrelationship between the two
statutes offers the advantages of the selective incorporation approach
and, in addition, fulfills Senator Bennett's intention as stated during
the debate on the Bennett amendment. Senator Bennett stated that
"[tihe purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of
conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nulli-
fied."' 35 Under the congruence approach, the two statutes do not
conflict; each continues to be enforced in its own separate sphere.'
36
In summary, the two statutes use the same standards in the narrow
area in which the two statutes are congruent; that is, wage discrimi-
nation actions alleging unequal pay for equal work.
Instances exist in which the plaintiff, for practical reasons, will
choose to bring suit under the Equal Pay Act or Title VII or both.
Differences between the two statutes include coverage, 37 procedural
prerequisites to suit,' 38 statutes of limitations, 139 the right to sue in
134. See Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979).
135. 110 CONG. REC. 13647 (1964).
136. See Gitt & Gelb, supra note 24, at 747.
137. Coverage under the Equal Pay Act is coextensive with the general coverage provi-
sions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I) (1976). Like the FLSA, the Equal Pay Act was
enacted pursuant to the commerce power. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2, 77
Stat. 56. The FLSA provides that any employee engaged in commerce, or in the production of
goods for commerce, or who is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce is covered by
the FLSA and, thus, the Equal Pay Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1976). Coverage under the Equal
Pay Act is actually somewhat broader than the FLSA because the exemptions found in section
213 of title 29, which exclude administrative, managerial and executive and certain other em-
ployees do not apply to the Equal Pay Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1976).
In contrast, Title VII prohibits discrimination by any employer in an industry "affecting
commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). The affecting commerce language contained in Title
VII provides for broader coverage than the language in the FLSA. Mitchell v. Lubin, Mc-
Gaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S. 207 (1959). The Congress amended Title VII in the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 662 (1972), and the FLSA by
the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 375 (1974), to
include state and local government employees. See generally Sape & Hart, Title VIIReconsid-
ered" The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972);
Elisburg, supra note 23.
The constitutionality of applying the Equal Pay Act to state and local government em-
ployees is unclear. This extension of Title VII protections to state and local government em-
ployees was upheld in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), on the grounds that the 1974
amendments were enacted under congressional authority derived from section five of the four-
teenth amendment. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 883 (1976), however, the
Supreme Court concluded that the extension of FLSA overtime and minimum wage provi-
sions to state employees constituted an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty. Id
at 2474. The Court, however, refused to decide whether similar legislation could be enacted
under section five of the fourteenth amendment.
Several lower federal courts have concluded that the Equal Pay Act, unlike the remainder
of the FLSA, may be extended to state and local government employees because like Title VII,
the Equal Pay Act is based in part on congressional power derived from section five of the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th
Cir. 1977). But see Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976). A federal
employee, however, is limited to suit under Title VII when he claims employment discrimina-
tion. Brown v. Gen. Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
138. For many reasons, an employee who brings a wage discrimination claim may wish to
federal court, 14 0 available remedies,' 4' right to jury trial 142 and the
right to attorneys fees and costs. 143 Thus, under the congruence ap-
proach, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act of concern to Senator
Bennett will not be nullified.
IV. Policy Arguments and Recommendations
All three theories are equally supported by the legislative his-
tory of the Bennett amendment. Therefore, one must look to the
general purposes of Title VII to ascertain which theory or theories
should prevail. The purpose of Title VII is to prohibit all discrimi-
nation in employment based on sex, race, color, religion or national
origin.144 Discrimination under Title VII has been defined as a dif-
ference in treatment which, butfor a person's sex, would be differ-
avoid the procedural maze that a plaintiff encounters in bringing a Title VII action. In order
to initiate a Title VII action, the employee must file a charge, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9-1601.12
(1979), with the E.E.O.C. within 180 days of the alleged unlawful act, unless the violation is a
continuing one. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976);
Willett v. Emory and Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Va. 1977). The employee may
not bring suit until he receives a statutory "right to sue" letter from the E.E.O.C. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1976). If the E.E.O.C. does not achieve conciliation between the parties, nor brings
suit on the charge within 180 days, the employee may demand his "right to sue" letter. Id To
avoid this lengthy process, the plaintiff may decide that it is advantageous to sue only under
the Equal Pay Act if he is claiming unequal pay for substantially equal work.
139. Under the FLSA, suit must be brought within two years of the date on which the
cause of action accrued, unless the violation is a willful violation, in which case suit must be
filed within three years of the alleged violation. 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976). Title VII does not
contain a statute of limitations provision, but, a charge must be filed within 180 days of the
alleged violation as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit; suit must be filed within ninety days of
receipt of statutory "right to sue" letter or suit will be barred for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., I.U.E. v. Robbins & Meyers, 429 U.S. 229 (1976); Johnson v. Ry. Express Co.,
421 U.S. 454 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
140. The FLSA clearly provides for filing of suit in either state or federal court. 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1976). Title VII, however, states, "[Elach United States District Court and each
United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have juris-
diction of actions brought under this title." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
Whether Congress intended to provide for concurrent jurisdiction is unclear. One state court,
however, has interpreted this language as creating exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.
Fox v. Eaton Corp., 48 Ohio St. 2d 236, 358 N.E.2d 536 (1976).
141. The nature of relief under the two statutes varies. Title VII provides for broad equi-
table remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). In the wage discrimination area, the recovery
sought is generally back pay. Unlike the Equal Pay Act, back pay under Title VII does not
accrue from a date earlier than two years prior to filing of the charge with the E.E.O.C. Id
Therefore, recovery of back pay under the Equal Pay Act may be greater than under Title VII.
The Equal Pay Act also allows for recovery of an extra sum in an amount equal to the back
pay claim as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976). If the violation of the Equal Pay
Act is willful, the employer may be subject to a criminal fine not to exceed $10,000. 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(a) (1976).
142. Under Title VII, the back pay remedy is related to the equitable remedy of reinstate-
ment. Therefore, as an equitable remedy, the plaintiff is not entitled to jury trial under Title
VII. Slack v. Having, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975). Accord, Morelock v. N.C.R., 546
F.2d 682 (6th Cir: 1976). In his discretion, however, the judge may impanel an advisory jury,
Cox v. Babcox & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 14 (4th Cir. 1972).
143. The language of the two statutes pertaining to attorneys fees may produce varied
results. The FLSA provides for the payment of attorneys fees and costs to the plainqff, should
he prevail. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976). In contrast, Title VII, provides for recovery of attorneys
fees by the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
144. Franks v. Boman Transp. Co., 724 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
ent. 05 Thus, some discriminatory wage differentials will not be
actionable if Title VII remedies are limited to the narrow confines of
the Equal Pay Act.' 46
In Senter v. General Motors, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
discussed the difficulty of proving a claim of intentional discrimina-
tion and noted that, "[p]roof of racial discrimination is seldom di-
rect, . . . an employee is at an inherent disadvantage in gathering
hard evidence of employment discrimination." '47 Yet, adoption of
the total incorporation approach makes this disadvantage even
greater for women alleging sex discrimination in wages. The total
incorporation approach adds a hurdle, in the form of the equal work
standard, between the employee and eventual relief under Title VII.
It is difficult to believe that Congress, having provided broad
equitable remedies for the purpose of alleviating discrimination
under Title VII, intended to allow intentional sex based wage dis-
crimination under Title VII to go unremedied. 4 Moreover, the leg-
islative history lacks any indication that Congress intended to offer
women less extensive protection under Title VII than other groups
protected under the Act.
Although the selective incorporation approach and the congru-
ence approach may seem inconsistent,'49 the Gunther court resolved
this possible conflict by stating the following test:
In summary, we hold that although decisions interpreting the
Equal Pay Act are authorized where plaintiffs suing under Title
VII raise a claim of equal pay, plaintiffs are not precluded from
suing under Title VII to protest other discriminatory compensa-
tion practices unless the practices are authorized under one of the
four affirmative defenses contained in the Equal Pay Act and in-
corporated into Title VII by § 703(h) [the Bennett amendment].' 50
A combination of the two approaches as suggested by the Gunther
court is a more reasonable interpretation of the Bennett amendment
145. See note 130 supra.
146. In short the EPA does not bar employers from engaging in violations of the
equal pay principle so long as they confine their discrimination to different 'establish-
ments' and do not run afoul of the equal pay principle within any one establishment.
Sullivan, The Equal Pay Act of 1963: Making and Breaking a Prima Facie Case, 31 ARK. L.
REV. 545, 549 (1978).
147. 532 F.2d 511, 526 (6th Cir. 1976).
148. See note 44 supra.
149. Under a pure selective incorporation model it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove
equal work in any Title VII action. In contrast, under the congruence approach one must
prove equal work under Title VII when making a claim for equal pay. Also, in theory under a
combination of the two approaches, it is clear that the four exceptions to the Equal Pay Act
would be absorbed into Title VII in the small area in which the two statutes are congruent, but
the doctrine is not clear on whether the exceptions would be adopted in "comparable" work
claims under Title VII. In Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), the
court combined the two theories in a manner in which the four exceptions are always incorpo-
rated into Title VII and the equal work standard is only incorporated where the plaintiff is
seeking equal pay.
150. 602 F.2d at 891.
and will allay Senator Bennett's fears that the Equal Pay Act would
be nullified. In summary, under a combination of the two minority
approaches, a Title VII plaintiff need prove equal work only when
he or she is alleging unequal pay for equal work, and the only de-
fense available to the employer who pays a discriminatory wage dif-
ferential is that it falls within one of the four exceptions to the Equal
Pay Act.
V. Conclusion
Until the Gunther and Westinghouse opinions, the courts have
generally followed the total incorporation approach without serious
consideration of the legislative history or the practical consequences
of this interpretation. The ambiguous language of the Bennett
amendment, however, allows several interpretations on the question
of whether Title VII incorporates the equal work and establishment
provisions of the Equal Pay Act. The determination of which theory
should prevail is dependent on a determination of which concept or
concepts best fulfill the purpose of the act: to end employment dis-
crimination. In an effort to reach this determination, great weight
should be afforded to the interpretations of Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act issued by the agencies that have the statutory duty to inter-
pret, administer and enforce the two acts."5' The E.E.O.C. rejected
the total incorporation approach notwithstanding the overwhelming
body of case law in favor of this approach. With the advent of the
151. The E.E.O.C. is authorized to "prevent any person from engaging in an unlawful
employment practice" as set forth in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976). Pursuant to this
statutory power, the E.E.O.C. may investigate and attempt informal conciliation of charges of
discriminatory employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). Pursuant to the new
reorganization plan discussed in note 16 supra, the E.E.O.C. has undertaken a study of the
comparable work problems which is beyond the scope of the total incorporation rule.
The EEOC has expressed particular concern for harmonizing interpretations of
the EPA with the parallel provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
USC §§2000e et seq.), the centerpiece of the Commission's jurisdiction. As part of
this concern for harmonizing the laws governing sex wage discrimination, the EEOC
has commissioned the National Academy of Sciences to investigate certain aspects of
the job evaluation process. An important focal point of the Academy's study is the
concept of "comparable pay" which expresses the theory that certain job categories,
traditionally held by women, have also traditionally been low-paying due to perva-
sive societal sex discrimination rather than any rational evaluation of the value of the
services performed by workers in those categories relative to workers in traditionally
male job categories. An example of this might be a bank which pays relatively low
wages to its secretaries and relatively high wages to its security guards. To correct
such situations, it has been suggested that employers be required to measure the rela-
tive value of the services supplied by their various job categories and make adjust-
ments in their pay scales accordingly. Copies of the Academy's interim report may
be obtained by contacting the EEOC's Office of Policy Implementation at 2401 E
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506, (202) 634-7060. A final report is expected in
December, 1979.
1 Fed. Reg. of Empl. Serv. (Lawyers Co-op) § 4:4 (Supp. Jan. 1980). For an example of a case
in which the plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought recovery under the Equal Pay Act on the theory
that female clerical employees contributed work to the employer of the same value as male
maintenance employees see Christiansen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
Gunther and Westinghouse opinions, the problems produced by the
adoption of the total incorporation approach will not require reme-
dial congressional action, but may be achieved by judicial accept-
ance of one or both of the alternative theories. Until Gunther, courts
may have felt compelled to follow the total incorporation approach
because of the unanimous judicial acceptance of this doctrine. Now,
however, the courts have other alternatives and may reexamine their
positions in light of reason and justice.
JAMES B. RoPP
